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THE KIBERA DEMOLITIONS: a response from the Constitution

The constitution does not value roads more than footpaths, cars more than people, grand railways and glass office towers more than those who are forced to live and do business in mabati shacks and kiosks. The constitution shows preference for rights over law. It means it is not an adequate answer to say only “they were there illegally”. By JILL COTTRELL GHAI AND YASH PAL GHAI.

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THE KIBERA DEMOLITIONS: a response from the Constitution

“Homes of 30,000 people in Kibera demolished to make way for a road”
– BBC World Service July 23rd

On the day when this became news, one of us had given a presentation on human rights at a workshop. Another presenter suggested governments might be embarrassed to be shown up internationally as seriously violating human rights. Your author responded, “I am not convinced this has any impact. The government shows no shame.”

The response of our government over the Kibera evictions was reported as being: “They were there illegally”.

Despite being lawyers, we want to suggest that such a legalistic approach is a complete violation of the constitution.

The constitution is the product of a vision. It was the vision of the people of Kenya: they were fed up. Fed up with tyranny, with lack of accountability, with lack of respect, with the accumulation of national resources and power in a few hands, with the capture of the state for personal gain. The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission in its Short Report, which accompanied the first draft constitution, said this:

The Review Act speaks of the needs of marginalized communities. You might almost say the Commission found a marginalized nation. … The whole nation feels alienated from the government and structures of authority. People feel neglected, and victimised. They consider they have no control over their life or destiny.

The constitution is the product of a vision. It was the vision of the people of Kenya: they were fed up. Fed up with tyranny, with lack of accountability, with lack of respect, with the accumulation of national resources and power in a few hands, with the capture of the state for personal gain.

It did not, though it might have, say Kenyans wanted to be free of what Shakespeare called the “arrogance of power”.

The response of the constitution drafters

Let’s begin at the beginning: the Preamble. It speaks of the people being committed to “nurturing and protecting the well-being of the individual, the family, communities and the nation”. And recognises that all Kenyans long for “a government based on the essential values of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law”.

The Constitution goes on to say that the people of Kenya are sovereign. What does this mean? If they are not empty words it means that the country belongs to the people. All the people. It does not belong just to the wealthy, the politically connected, the obsessed-with-their-own-power. It must mean, and it thus follows, that it is a total negation of the constitution to ride rough-shod over the lives, livelihoods, homes, happiness and prospects of thousands of fellow citizens.

Early in the Constitution is the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is made clear: it is “to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings”. It later says: “Every person has inherent dignity and the right to have that dignity respected and protected”.

How do you respect the dignity of people, achieve social justice and enable people to realise their potential by grinding into the dust their birth certificates, their school certificates, their mementos and their hopes?

The constitution says: “Every person has the right … not to be subjected to any form of violence from either public or private sources, … or treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading manner”. Violence is not just a matter of physical force. Treatment is not just about medical treatment.

The constitution shows particular care for older members of society, and minorities and marginalised groups and children. “A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child”. Everyone (and minorities and marginalized are particularly mentioned) has a right to have reasonable access to water and health services. The elderly have the right to live in dignity and respect and be free from abuse; to receive reasonable care and assistance from the family and the state (not to be hounded out of their homes by that state).

Eviction standards

Everyone, the constitution tells us, has the right to housing. No one would deny that sometimes people will have to lose their homes in order for important development to take place. The Land Act as amended provides for evictions to be as decent as possible, and in its provisions at least, was intended to implement the constitution. It says that evictions must be carried out in a manner that respects people’s dignity, right to life and security. There must be special measures to ensure protection of women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. There must be special measures to ensure that there is no arbitrary loss of people’s possessions. And force used only when necessary.

The Land Act as amended provides for evictions to be as decent as possible, and in its provisions at least, was intended to implement the constitution. It says that evictions must be carried out in a manner that respects people’s dignity, right to life and security. How can the indiscriminate use of bulldozers possibly respect these rules?

How can the indiscriminate use of bulldozers possibly respect these rules?

Kenyan courts have also said that evictions must be planned to avoid disrupting schools, work, and take account weather conditions. Instead people are evicted in a particularly cold July and in the closing weeks of the school term.

Courts have also indicated the need for engagement with communities before evictions take place.

Distorted priorities

The dismal truth is that our so-called leaders, and the people who do their will, are blind to the vision of the constitution. The notion that a person who lives in Kibera or Korogocho or Mathare (and indeed the 60 percent of the people of Nairobi who live in informal settlements) is just as worthy of respect and dignity as the well-heeled, well-fed and comfortably housed is beyond their comprehension. In truth the constitution is beyond their blinkered ability to comprehend.

The constitution does not value roads more than footpaths, cars more than people, grand railways and glass office towers more than those who are forced to live and do business in mabati shacks and kiosks.

The constitution shows preference for rights over law. It means it is not an adequate answer to say only “they were there illegally”.

Large scale evictions are not easy anywhere. That must be admitted. Indeed it is precisely because of this that the United Nations adopted Guidelines on Development Related Evictions, which were relied upon by our courts when they laid down guidance on evictions, and are imperfectly reflected in the Land Act.

But the truth is that the Kenyan authorities are not just uncaring, lacking empathy with the people who elect them and whom the constitution says they are supposed to serve rather than rule. They are also incompetent.

It cannot be beyond the wit of public servants to think things through from the beginning. What is the best route for a road (preferably to avoid human suffering as far as possible)? Can the land be gradually cleared, ensuring that people have places to go, and that is not just structure owners (themselves squatters) who get compensated?

Doesn’t all this make the President’s Big Four promises sound a bit empty? Most of the people evicted would never be able to afford even his “affordable” housing.

When will the government, national and county, develop a real plan for Nairobi, including a strategy for informal settlements that is more caring and sophisticated than a bulldozer? When will they learn that it needs an integrated, evidence based, publicly debated and approved, approach that will ensure decent, affordable public transport, not just off the cuff ideas that go nowhere, like lipstick lines?

Doesn’t all this make the President’s Big Four promises sound a bit empty? Most of the people evicted would never be able to afford even his “affordable” housing.

How long can Kenya’s elite get away with treating so many citizens with such scorn and lack of respect?

Related links

Report of the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Volume Five Technical Appendices
The Constitution of Kenya Review Act, 1997
Physical Planning Act No.6 of 1996
Petition 239 of 2014
Anguish as houses demolished to pave way for Kibera link road
Over 20,000 people left homeless in Kibera demolition
Residents of Kibera decry short notice as demolitions continue
Prof. Yash Pal Ghai condemns the government for demolishing Kibera houses
Structures on road reserve in Kibera set to be demolished
Stop inhumane Kibera demolitions, KNCHR tells KURA
Evictions in Nairobi: Why the city has a problem and what can be done
Mass eviction looms in Kibera to pave way for road works
Raila’s party protests government eviction of Kibera residents to construct road
Kibera residents facing eviction to meet roads officials
Kura, Amnesty in Twitter spat over Kibera demolitions
Kibera Slum Kenya Demolition of Homes – 30,000 Displaced
Agencies agree to compensate Kibera residents facing eviction

(Additional research by Juliet Attelah)

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KENYA AND ZIMBABWE: The mirrored histories of settler occupation and autocracy that produced electoral criminality

Consider Mama Sylvia Maphosa, 56, avoiding trouble the day after Zimbabwe’s election, shot in the back by a sniper – one more victim of a culture of electoral violence stretching from Harare to Nairobi, where Baby Pendo’s killers are still abroad. But the remarkable inability to manage democratic elections in Zimbabwe and Kenya, both former settler colonies with turbulent legacies of violence, land dispossession and its vexed post-colonial aftermaths, are only partly explained by their histories. For that, cue the role of Big Man politics and Big Power interests. By MIRIAM ABRAHAM

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KENYA AND ZIMBABWE: The mirrored histories of settler occupation and autocracy that produced electoral criminality

Mama Sylvia Maphosa, was on her way home on 1 August, having been released early from work by her employer of over 15 years, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority in Harare. Although this was the first presidential election without Robert Mugabe on the ballot since 1980, the 56-year-old mother of two did not care much for them or for politics in general. She just wanted to get home to her husband Robert Maphosa, who she had discouraged from his routine of picking her up from work for fear that he may be caught up in protests in the city.

Little did she know that it was her own life that was at risk. The bullet that lodged in her back was administered with the accuracy of a sniper targeting a heavily armed enemy. Yet, this was a woman fleeing the violence meted by the State in its alleged bid to quell opposition protests following the announcement by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) that President Emmerson Mnangagwa and the ruling ZANU-PF party had won the July 30 election, with 50.8 percent of the vote and the Movement for Democratic Change candidate Nelson Chamisa receiving 44.3 percent.

The murder of Mama Sylvia Maphosa and those of five other Zimbabweans in the immediate aftermath of a disputed election are no different than that of Baby Samantha Pendo, Stephanie Moraa Nyarangi, Jeremiah Maranga, Thomas Odhiambo Okul, Bernard Okoth Odoyo, Raphael Ayieko, Victor Okoth Obondo, Privel Ochieng Ameso, Shady Omondi Juma to cite the most prominent victims. They, along with scores of others were murdered a year ago in Kenya’s electoral violence. The histories and trajectories of Kenya and Zimbabwe often mirror each other. As I often tease my friends from Zimbabwe, since elections in Kenya are often a year after theirs, we provide a good playbook in mediocrity for them to perfect.

The murder of Mama Sylvia Maphosa and those of five other Zimbabweans in the immediate aftermath of a disputed election are no different than that of Baby Samantha Pendo, Stephanie Moraa Nyarangi, Jeremiah Maranga, Thomas Odhiambo Okul, Bernard Okoth Odoyo, Raphael Ayieko, Victor Okoth Obondo, Privel Ochieng Ameso, Shady Omondi Juma to cite the most prominent victims. They, along with scores of others were murdered a year ago in Kenya’s electoral violence.

Kenya and Zimbabwe share a spectacular inability to conduct uncontested presidential elections. We could of course blame our common colonial masters, and this may not be far-fetched. Both countries became colonies of the British Empire after the infamous Berlin conference on the partition of Africa with colonial rule taking root in 1890 in Zimbabwe and 1895 in Kenya. The methods colonialists deployed to suppress the local communities were marked with violence, coercion, bribery and dispossession. Their priority was to take over the fertile highlands in both countries, which they dubbed the ‘white highlands’ in Kenya, and minerals especially in Zimbabwe. The divide and rule tactics used between the Shona and the Ndebele were not any different from those used in Kenya to divide its numerous communities. The enduring aftermath in both countries, however, has been the ethnicisation of politics and the land question, which both countries have managed differently in the post-colonial era.

The colonial administration in both countries instituted racial stratification through the expropriation and allocation of land to settlers. In Kenya, the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance declared the British Crown responsible for the administration of all land in Kenya, displacing millions who were then placed in ‘reserves’ as forced labour in the farms. The still-to-be implemented Ndung’u Commission report comprehensively details this history including the post-colonial political patronage using public land. By independence in 1963 in Kenya, over eight million acres of land, representing nearly 75 per cent of Kenya’s arable land had been transferred to the settlers.

In Zimbabwe, informal alienation of land began with the arrival of the European settlers who began to claim large tracts of land. Exactly the same year that the Land Ordinance was declared in Kenya in 1902, the colonialists in Zimbabwe established ‘indigenous reserves’. In their edited book, Becoming Zimbabwe, Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, grapple with the colonial land history and track the various political and socio-economic developments until 2009. They show how millions of Zimbabweans were rendered landless with a few white commercial farmers controlling approximately 18 million hectares (50 percent) of agricultural land.

However, unlike Kenya, post-independent Zimbabwe’s approach to land redistribution has been remarkably different. As renowned author and academic, Mahmood Mamdani, notes Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform of 2000-2003 saw “ the greatest transfer of property in southern Africa since colonization. Unlike in Kenya where former colonial families and a few political heavyweights own the majority of the fertile land, in Zimbabwe 80 percent of land owned by white farmers was expropriated and redistributed, albeit in some cases to political operatives. Nonetheless, this resulted in more than a hundred thousand smallholder owners. Despite the unacceptable violence used during the land distribution, the harsh economic sanctions from the West, the contracted economic growth, hyperinflation, unemployment, among other ills, the fast track land reform has not turned out to be as disastrous as it was prophesied.

Parallels between Zimbabwe and Kenya go beyond the shared colonial history and the attendant land issues. The political parties that ushered in both countries to independence shared a history and almost the same name – Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The tactics that President Robert Mugabe used to ensure the dominance of ZANU are not any different from those used by President Jomo Kenyatta and his successor President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi. The 1980s and 90s saw the most repressive period in the history of both countries, economic hardships partly arising from corruption and the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the international financial institutions. There was remarkable brain-drain from both countries during this period, with an educated professional elite heading mostly to South Africa, Europe and the United States.

There are striking similarities when one considers events surrounding the 2007 elections in Kenya and that of Zimbabwe in 2008. Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) gained parliamentary majorities against President Mwai Kibaki and President Robert Mugabe’s parties, respectively. Early results from polling stations pointed to the incumbents losing the presidency to the opposition. It was therefore not surprising for protests and violence to erupt in both countries once they stubbornly refused to hand over power. International mediation initiatives led to power-sharing arrangements, creating the post of prime minister under the Grand Coalition government in Kenya and the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe. The power-sharing arrangements were fraught with wrangling, with ODM urging its leadership to withdraw from the power-sharing government in early 2009 due to deep perceptions of marginalization, and Tsvangirai’s MDC-T ‘disengaging’ from government. However, despite the dysfunctionality and machinations, the power-sharing arrangement in both countries remained intact until the 2013 General Elections.

There are striking similarities when one considers events surrounding the 2007 elections in Kenya and that of Zimbabwe in 2008. Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) gained parliamentary majorities…Early results from polling stations pointed to the incumbents losing the presidency to the opposition. It was therefore not surprising for protests and violence to erupt in both countries once the incumbents refused to hand over power. International mediation initiatives led to power-sharing arrangements, creating the post of prime minister under the Grand Coalition government in Kenya and the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in Zimbabwe.

Despite the reforms that took place in both countries following the signing of the internationally-mediated agreements in 2008, Zimbabwe and Kenya did not seem to have changed much on the electoral front. The same scenario of contested elections was repeated in 2013 albeit with ingenuity. This time, parliamentary seats were also targeted to maintain the popularity or “tyranny of numbers” narrative. They had learned from the fiasco of 2007/8 where the opposition had more parliamentary seats than the ruling party.

There is ample evidence that the stunning margin of 61.09% victory for President Mugabe against Morgan Tsvangirai’s 33.94% was anything but a free, fair and credible election. Two Commissioners of ZEC resigned with one saying, “I do not wish to enumerate the many reasons for my resignation, but they all have to do with the manner the Zimbabwe 2013 Harmonized Elections were proclaimed and conducted”. Numerous other anomalies were noted including the existence of 65 non-gazetted polling stations, astronomically high numbers of ‘assisted voters’ despite the fact that Zimbabwe ranks first in Africa with its 90 percent literacy rate. Thousands of persons were turned away from voting in opposition strongholds, among other irregularities.

Meanwhile in Kenya, the General Election in 2013 suffered the same fate. Although conducted in a peaceful manner, there were complaints raised regarding the register of voters, intimidation of voters, technological failure among others. According to Kenyan Election Observation Group (ELOG), the process was marked by “botched procurement process that was dogged by allegations of impropriety, delays in timelines for voter registration, and widespread failure of biometric verification kits on Election Day. Indeed, the failure of the biometric voter registration system ranked amongst the most serious threats to the integrity of the 2013 elections, and contributed to public perceptions of incompetence, corruption and electoral fraud”.

In both cases, the 2013 presidential election was subjected to legal petitions with the Courts upholding the results as announced by the respective election management bodies. Curiously, the response in both countries was again stunningly similar. Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga accepted the ruling of the Supreme Court and “moved on”. Rt. Hon. Morgan Tsvangirai had withdrawn his case from the Constitutional Court shortly before its verdict was rendered noting that the Court was biased. He nevertheless did not appeal to his supporters to protest. These unsuccessful legal bids paved the way for Robert Mugabe to be sworn in for his 33rd year in office and for Uhuru Kenyatta to begin his first term as president of Kenya.

Given the trajectory of electoral processes in Kenya and Zimbabwe as noted above, it is unsurprising to see the parallels between the electoral process in Kenya in 2017 and that of Zimbabwe this year. Not to be outdone, Zimbabwe’s security apparatus has mounted a violent crackdown against the opposition, just as their counterparts in Kenya did in the aftermath of the 2017 election. In its conduct, ZEC has not acted any differently from the IEBC, making one wonder if they are cut from the same cloth. It is unsurprising that the opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa has done exactly what Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga did last year when faced with elections that he considered altered in favor of the incumbent. The MDC-T has filed a petition in the Constitutional Court.

In both cases, the 2013 presidential election was subjected to legal petitions with the Courts upholding the results as announced by the respective election management bodies. Curiously, the response in both countries was again stunningly similar. Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga accepted the ruling of the Supreme Court and “moved on”. Rt. Hon. Morgan Tsvangirai had withdrawn his case from the Constitutional Court shortly before its verdict was rendered noting that the Court was biased…These unsuccessful legal bids paved the way for Robert Mugabe to be sworn in for his 33rd year in office and for Uhuru Kenyatta to begin his first term as president of Kenya.

It is barely conceivable that Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court will take the bold step that Kenya’s Supreme Court took last year of annulling the presidential vote, but the end result of the political game appears to be headed down the same path. The region and the international community, as it did in Kenya, has decided to cast it lot with the ZANU-PF. They have concluded that stability trumps electoral justice. Emerson Mnangagwa’s human rights record – he is commonly referred to as The Crocodile, and for good reason – is an open book, but he has recalibrated his approach to the West claiming that his country is “open for business” . The West is eager too. The international financial institutions are itching to return to Zimbabwe with the World Bank already having conducted a scoping mission to Harare in February, without waiting for the electoral process to play out.

It is barely conceivable that Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Court will take the bold step that Kenya’s Supreme Court took last year of annulling the presidential vote… The region and the international community, as it did in Kenya, has decided to cast it lot with the ZANU-PF. They have concluded that stability trumps electoral justice.

As was the case with Raila Odinga, it is expected that Nelson Chamisa will receive pressure from the US, the UK, the UN and neighboring countries and receive reminders that the unity and peace of the country would serve the country better than a long season of dispute and protest. He will be told that that is the way statesmen act: in the interest of the nation. He will be reminded that he is young and would not want to be sanctioned. He will be reminded of his legacy and how much political capital he still has ahead of him. Promises will be made to him and his party.

As was the case with Raila Odinga, it is expected that Nelson Chamisa will receive pressure from the US, the UK, the UN and neighboring countries and receive reminders that the unity and peace of the country would serve the country better than a long season of dispute and protest. He will be told that that is the way statesmen act: in the interest of the nation. He will be reminded that he is young and would not want to be sanctioned. He will be reminded of his legacy and how much political capital he still has ahead of him. Promises will be made to him and his party.

And at the appropriate time, Nelson Chamisa will have his handshake with the Crocodile, unless the powerful vice-president and minister of defence, Constantino Chiwenga, torpedoes it. We will then forget and move on until 2022/23. Sadly, the memories of 2018 will remain in the hearts of Sylvia Maphosa’s family and of those whose loved ones have been sacrificed in the pursuit of power.

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POWER, AID AND IMPUNITY: How the aid industry sexually exploited the world’s poor

When reports emerged that senior aid officials in OXFAM, the world’s biggest humanitarian charity, had routinely sexually exploited vulnerable young women in Haiti, it touched off a scandal that has left the Western humanitarian industry reeling. It was merely the tip of the iceberg, as a recent UK House of Commons report attests. Impunity is rife within the UN system and the NGOs associated with it. How to rein it in? By RASNA WARAH  

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POWER, AID AND IMPUNITY: How the aid industry sexually exploited the world’s poor

For decades, sun-drenched Haiti, with its beautiful beaches and Third World-type poverty, has attracted a vast array of aid and humanitarian workers who have set up camp in this Caribbean nation ostensibly to lift its people out of their miserable conditions. Because of the huge number of local and international NGOs in the country, Haiti is often described as “The Republic of NGOs”.

Despite the large presence of NGOs and aid agencies, however, Haiti remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and the most impoverished nation in the Western hemisphere. Both natural disasters and political unrest, combined with a culture of aid dependency, have contributed to this state of affairs. A Western journalist writing about Haiti has described the country as “a poster child for the inadequacies of aid”.

The presence of large numbers of mostly young, naïve and sexually active foreign and local aid workers has also created an environment where vulnerable women and children are being sexually exploited or abused by the very people who are supposed to be helping or protecting them, including United Nations peacekeepers. According to an internal United Nations report obtained by the Associated Press in 2017, at least 134 Sri Lankan UN peacekeepers exploited nine Haitian children in a sex ring from 2004 to 2007. One of the victims said that the soldiers would pass her number along to incoming contingents, who would then call her for sex. One boy claimed that he had had sex with more than 20 Sri Lankan soldiers. Another teenage boy claimed that he had been gang-raped by Uruguayan soldiers who even had the audacity to film the attack on a cellphone. Although 114 of these peacekeepers were sent home after the report came out, none of them was prosecuted or court martialed.

Despite the large presence of NGOs and aid agencies, however, Haiti remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and the most impoverished nation in the Western hemisphere. Natural disasters and political unrest, combined with a culture of aid dependency, have contributed to this state of affairs. A Western journalist writing about Haiti has described the country as “a poster child for the inadequacies of aid”.

These incidents are not confined to Haiti. A separate investigation published by the Associated Press last year revealed that nearly 2,000 allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers have been made in other troubled parts of the world. However, this number could be a gross underestimation as the majority of victims of sexual exploitation or abuse do not report their cases.

“Sexual exploitation” is defined by the UN as “an actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another”. “Sexual abuse” is defined as “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions”.

Stories of aid workers, UN peacekeepers and UN employees using their privileged positions to sexually exploit or abuse women and children in poor countries have been in the public domain for a long time but it is only now that the international development community has taken notice and decided to do something about it.

It all started in February this year, when the Times newspaper revealed that staff at Oxfam GB, one of Britain’s most respected charities, had paid local women for sex while carrying out humanitarian work in Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake that devastated the country and which led to widespread internal displacement of the quake’s victims. This revelation, at a time when the #MeToo movement was gaining momentum, resulted in several similar exposés, the latest being of a senior UN gender advisor – an Indian male called Ravi Karkara – who is currently being investigated for sexually harassing young men in his office.

Stories of aid workers, UN peacekeepers and UN employees using their privileged positions to sexually exploit or abuse women and children in poor countries have been in the public domain for a long time but it is only now that the international development community has taken notice and decided to do something about it.

The Oxfam scandal also set in motion a series of events, including withdrawal of funding to Oxfam by its leading donors, including the UK’s Department of International Development (DfID), and calls for thorough investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by those working in the aid sector globally.

This particular scandal prompted the UK’s House of Commons to carry out further investigations, not just on the conduct of Oxfam staff, but on the conduct of staff working for other charities and aid organisations as well. The House of Commons’ final report, released on 31 July this year, sent shockwaves across the aid sector, and has led to demands for stricter measures to be taken against those who commit sexual crimes against vulnerable populations. The report states that “sexual violence, exploitation and abuse against women and girls in endemic in many developing countries, especially where there is conflict and forced displacement.”

The UK legislators who drafted the report and carried out the investigations also found that the aid industry’s response to sexual misconduct had been “reactive, patchy and sluggish” and that very few organisations actually follow up on reports that have raised the red flag about sexual exploitation or abuse by their employees. For instance, no action was taken after the release of a 2002 assessment by the UN’s refugee agency UNHCR and the charity Save the Children of the effects of sexual violence on children in conflict areas. That assessment documented 67 cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of refugee children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone in which 40 aid agencies and 9 peacekeeping missions were implicated; the majority of the victims were aged between 13 and 18.

And, despite being warned three years ago that internally displaced and refugee Syrian women were being sexually exploited by men delivering aid on behalf of the UN, the UN did little to arrest the problem, even though the UN’s Population Fund had conducted a gender assessment last year that showed that Syrian women were being forced to engage in “food-for-sex” arrangements with aid workers. The House of Commons report, titled “”Sexual exploitation and abuse in the aid sector”, states that “sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers, amongst others, is an entrenched feature of the life experience of women and girls in Syria in the eighth year of the conflict there” and that similar cases around world are merely “the tip of the iceberg”.

The UK legislators further found that a 2007 study for the Humanitarian Partnership conducted in Kenya, Namibia and Thailand found that although the beneficiaries of aid knew that sexual exploitation and abuse was going on, the majority said that they would not report these cases because they didn’t want to risk losing the aid. On their part, humanitarian aid workers were reluctant to report their fellow workers for fear of retaliation.

The House of Commons report does not spare any organisation, not even in the much-revered United Nations, for allowing such abuse to continue. “When it comes to investigating sexual exploitation and abuse allegations, the UN’s approach lacks coherence,” it states. “There is no single body taking an overall interest in the outcomes of investigations or driving them towards resolution…”

What the report failed to recognise is that although the UN has a stated “zero tolerance” for sexual abuse and exploitation, few, if any, of the perpetrators face justice – not only because the UN’s internal justice system is flawed but also because international UN staff enjoy immunity from prosecution, which means such cases are not likely to end up in court.

In addition, because the UN is more concerned about protecting its reputation than about bringing justice to victims, those who are perceived to be tainting the organisation (the people who come out and report such cases) are quickly sacrificed. In 2014, for example, Anders Kompass (who has since resigned as the director of field operations at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) was suspended after he sent an internal UN report to French authorities detailing cases of French peacekeepers sexually exploiting internally displaced boys in the Central African Republic. At that time the UN claimed that Kompass had put the victims at risk but it soon became evident that the UN had no intention to act on the report or to make its findings public. Kompass was only reinstated after there was an outcry in the media about the case, but by then he had already made the decision to resign. He said that his ordeal had left him “disappointed and full of sadness”.

The House of Commons report does not spare any organisation, not even in the much-revered United Nations, for allowing such abuse to continue…What the report failed to recognise is that although the UN has a stated “zero tolerance” for sexual abuse and exploitation, few, if any, of the perpetrators face justice – not only because the UN’s internal justice system is flawed but also because international UN staff enjoy immunity from prosecution, which means such cases are not likely to end up in court.

This is one of the problems afflicting all aid and humanitarian organisations. Because these organisations survive on donations, the whiff of sexual or other type of scandal could mean the drying up of donor funds, which could affect jobs and projects. So to keep the donor funds flowing, incidents of misconduct are quickly covered up or not investigated. In some cases, the perpetrators are allowed to resign quietly or are transferred to a remote duty station. Meanwhile those who report these cases often find themselves out of a job – the UN, in particular, is notorious for not renewing the contracts of whistleblowers.

However, things are likely to change. Aid and humanitarian organisations that fail to report or address the issue of sexual crimes or misconduct by their employees could find themselves having to close shop, especially if their biggest donors pull out. Since the Haiti scandal, for example, Oxfam has been struggling to survive. Bigger multilateral organisations like the UN, which are funded by member states are, however, unlikely to face such threats because “they are too big to fail”, which is a pity because levels of impunity at the UN are extremely high. Whereas small charities and international NGOs have to be accountable to their donors to survive, the UN can basically get away with all manner of wrongdoing because the UN is accountable only to itself. Few, if any, member states have threatened to pull out of the organisation because of its lack of accountability or because its employees are behaving badly.

Former UN employees who have suffered retaliation as a result of their reporting complain that the UN’s internal justice system is heavily biased in favour of the perpetrator, particularly if he or she is a senior manager. Experiences of UN whistleblowers indicate that those who file a complaint against a senior UN official are not tolerated within the organisation and that the majority of whistleblowers suffer severe retaliation, despite the UN’s whistleblower protection policy. For instance, recently the country director for UNAIDS in Ethiopia, who was a key witness in a sexual harassment and assault investigation involving the UNAIDS deputy director, was suspended from her job in March this year, an action that smacks both of a cover-up and retaliation. As a result, several African women activists called for the resignation of the UNAIDS Executive Director, Michel Sidibé, but he has consistently ignored this call, as has the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

Current and former UN employees have reported a flawed grievance system that is stacked against the victims. One woman told the UK’s Guardian newspaper that she was raped by a senior UN staff member while working in a remote location but did not obtain justice despite medical evidence and witness testimonies. Because UN staff members cannot take their cases to national courts, (because UN employees enjoy immunity from prosecution), they have to rely on the UN’s internal justice systems, which are deeply flawed and which rarely deliver justice. As I have argued in previous articles, the UN has to overhaul its internal justice system and put in place external independent mechanisms that are more transparent and accountable – and which do not victimise whistleblowers.

Now, finally, such an external independent mechanism might just see the light of day. The House of Commons report makes a recommendation that could radically transform how sexual exploitation and abuse cases are handled within the aid sector: the establishment of “an independent aid ombudsman to provide the right to appeal, an avenue through which those who have suffered can seek justice by other means”. This recommendation, which will be discussed at an International Safeguarding Conference in October this year, could drastically alter the way aid organisations operate and could be a game changer for victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. It is undoubtedly one of the best recommendations to be put on the table of an industry that has become a cesspit of impunity and which is more interested in self-preservation than actually doing good in this world.

However, my fear is that if this ombudsman lacks the power to investigate and prosecute, then it will merely become an entity that collects and documents complaints rather than one that carries out investigations and brings cases to trial, or one that has the authority to force aid organisations to dismiss or penalise employees who are implicated in sexual harassment, exploitation or abuse.

My hope is that this ombudsman will not just address the issues of sexual harassment, exploitation and abuse, but will also be receptive to receiving cases of other types of abuse within the aid sector, particularly the abuse of power and authority, which allows all manner of wrongdoing, including fraud, corruption, nepotism, and gross mismanagement, to continue.

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CHINA’S DEBT IMPERIALISM: The Art of War by Other Means?

The Belt and Road Initiative, China’s ambitious attempt to create a global infrastructure corridor spanning 65 countries and connecting 60 percent of the world’s population, is the biggest imperial coming-out party in modern history. Not by armed conquest but by a strategy of debt-financed diplomacy, from Sri Lanka to Montenegro, from Islamabad to Mombasa, China is deploying its $3.2 trillion credit surplus to establish a 21st century Oriental Empire, impoverishing entire continents through the allure of roads, railways and bridges. DAVID NDII conducts a global cost-benefit analysis.

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CHINA’S DEBT IMPERIALISM: The Art of War by Other Means?

Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without fighting, captures their cities without laying siege, he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.” ~Sun Tzu

Colombo. On June 8, Fly Dubai’s last flight departed from Sri Lanka’s spanking new Mattala Rajapaska International Airport. It was the only airline flying there. Sri Lanka’s national airline stopped flying there in 2015. The “world’s emptiest airport” as its been known since it opened in 2013, is now officially a lily white elephant. The airport is a stone’s throw from Habantota, the world’s emptiest sea port that has made Sri Lanka the poster child of China’s predatory lending. The two are the largest of a slew of ill-fated mega-infrastructure projects that were supposed to transform Habantota, which happens to be the home town of former President Mahinda Rajapaska (for whom the airport is named, or rather, who named it for himself), into Sri Lanka’s second city.

It has not quite worked out that way. Rajapaska lost elections in 2015 in a cloud of corruption scandals, after a decade in power during which he buried Sri Lanka in a mountain of Chinese debt. After weighing its options the successor government ceded the Habantota port to China in exchange of a partial debt write-off. It has not helped. Sri Lanka is still caught in China’s debt trap. Last year, it turned to the IMF for a bailout. This year, Sri Lanka is looking to raise US$ 1.25 billion from China to keep up with its debt repayments.

Podgorica If you are an imperialist looking for a European client state, you could not do better than Montenegro. It is small (population: 620,000; GDP US$4 billion), vulnerable, and in a most strategic location on the Adriatic coast. Its hinterland includes Serbia and Hungary, both landlocked, as well as the Black Sea countries (Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine) whose access to the sea, the Bosphorous, is controlled by Turkey.

Montenegro has been mulling a grand motorway from its port city of Bar to Boljare on the Serbian border for a long time, a distance of only 165 kilometres, but the country is extremely rugged, making the cost prohibitive. Two feasibility studies done in 2006 and 2012 for the Montenegro government and the European Investment Bank concluded that the highway was not economically viable. Then China came along.

The first 41 kilometres of the highway, built with an EUR 800 million Chinese loan, has nearly bankrupted Montenegro, forcing the government to raise taxes, freeze public wages and cut welfare spending. Borrowing close to 20 percent of GDP to build a quarter of a road is unwise. Unable to proceed, Montenegro has signed an MOU with the Chinese contractor to complete and operate it as a toll road on undisclosed terms. The fear now is that the Chinese have extracted onerous revenue guarantees. The contractor is none other than the state owned corruption scandal prone China Road and Bridge Company, the builder and operator of Kenya’s new standard gauge railway.

Montenegro has been mulling a grand motorway from its port city of Bar to Boljare on the Serbian border for a long time, a distance of only 165 kilometres…Two feasibility studies done in 2006 and 2012 for the Montenegro government and the European Investment Bank concluded that the highway was not economically viable. Then China came along. The first 41 kilometres of the highway, built with an EUR 800 million Chinese loan, has nearly bankrupted Montenegro, forcing the government to raise taxes, freeze public wages and cut welfare spending. Borrowing close to 20 percent of GDP to build a quarter of a road is unwise.

Islamabad. Pakistan sits between China and the Persian Gulf. When China buys oil from the Middle East and Africa, it has to be shipped 6000 kilometres round India, through the Straits of Malacca to the South China Sea. The Malacca Dilemma refers to China’s vulnerability to a potential trade blockade on this narrow sliver of ocean between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Enter CPEC. CPEC stands for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Billed as a crown jewel of the Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC is an ambitious and costly modernization of Pakistan’s infrastructure centred on a transport corridor linking China’s “landlocked” hinterland to Pakistan’s Arabian sea port of Gwadar. The corridor cuts the distance of China’s western border to the sea by half, from four to two thousand kilometres. China has already taken control of the Gwadar port on a 40-year lease and is building an airport and industrial parks— effectively making it a Chinese enclave inside Pakistan. Costed at US$40 billion when it was launched in 2013, CPEC’s price tag has escalated to US$ 62 billion.

Four years on, Pakistan is in deep financial trouble. The CPEC projects are bleeding the country and destabilizing the economy. In addition to CPEC debt, Pakistan is now living on a Chinese financial lifeline —US$5 billion so far — to stave off a foreign exchange crisis. A succession of devaluations have failed to stem the tide, and foreign reserves are now down to less than two months requirements. Pakistan is now caught between the proverbial devil and the deep blue sea: to go for an IMF bailout or to settle into becoming a Chinese client state. An IMF bailout would put pressure on Pakistan to scale down CPEC and expose the secretive financing to western scrutiny.

CPEC stands for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Billed as a crown jewel of the Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC is an ambitious and costly modernization of Pakistan’s infrastructure centred on a transport corridor linking China’s “landlocked” hinterland to Pakistan’s Arabian sea port of Gwadar, cutting the distance of China’s western border to the sea from four to two thousand kilometres. China has already taken control of the Gwadar port on a 40-year lease and is building an airport and industrial parks— effectively making it a Chinese enclave inside Pakistan. Costed at US$40 billion when it was launched in 2013, the price tag has escalated to US$ 62 billion. Four years on, Pakistan is in deep financial trouble.

What is China up to?

There are two readily apparent economic objectives that China could be pursuing, one immediate, and one longer term.

The immediate objective is investment diversification. China is sitting on US$ 3.2 trillion of foreign reserves accumulated from its trade surpluses with the rest of the world, more than those of the next four countries combined (Japan $1.27 billion, Switzerland $0.74 bn, Saudi Arabia $0.9 bn, Russia $0.46 bn). Most of this money is held in safe but low yielding American and European government securities, with just over a third (US$ 1.2 trillion) in US government securities. Analysts estimate that another one third is held in other US dollar-denominated securities.

The longer term objective is sustaining its economic rise. China’s economy may be the world’s biggest but it is still a middle-income country, with an average income of less than a fifth of Singapore. One of the big questions out there is whether China will escape the “middle income trap”. The middle income trap is the observation that while many countries easily transition from poor to middle income status, only a few managed to transition from middle to high income. Of 103 countries that were middle income in 1960, according to an analysis by the World Bank, only 13 had transitioned to high income status by 2008, almost fifty years later.

China is sitting on US$ 3.2 trillion of foreign reserves accumulated from its trade surpluses with the rest of the world, more than those of the next four countries combined. Most of this money is held in safe but low yielding American and European government securities…Returns on these have been pretty dismal since the global financial crisis. But outside these markets there aren’t many assets that can absorb money on this scale. The BRI can thus be seen as a strategy by China to create such assets.

China has followed the export-led industrialization model of Japan and the Asian Tiger economies. This model will soon run its course. China’s average manufacturing wage has increased three-fold in dollar terms over the last decade, and is now on a par with the poorer former communist eastern European countries. To make the transition will require China to move up the product value chain, or as a recent paper by investment bank UBS put it, from “made in” to “created in” China. This will entail moving its factories abroad, some closer to markets, some to low-wage locations. Some of the BRI initiatives do seem to be gearing up for this. CPEC is an obvious case. China’s Great Wall company has a manufacturing plant in Bulgaria, which is in the hinterland of the Montenegro motorway.

It still begs the question why it needs to roll out the biggest building project since the Great Wall of China. Japan and the other Asian Tigers did not have to. And the BRI’s scale and aggression defies these rational economic objectives. If it goes to plan, it will span 65 countries, accounting for 60 percent of the world’s population and 40 percent of global economic output, and cost between four and eight trillion dollars That is not economics. It is empire building. It is not inconceivable that China is operating on a nineteenth century imperialism blueprint. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative graphics that litter the internet conjure images of Chinese power men around a world map sticking pins on strategic targets.

It is off to a rough start. Mahathir Mohammed, Malaysia’s comeback prime minister has cancelled three big BRI projects worth $22 billion signed by his predecessor, who is now facing corruption charges. He says he is trying to save Malaysia from bankruptcy. Even Burma’s steely generals have got cold feet. They have cancelled a port project citing fears that it could end up like Sri Lanka’s Habantota. Earlier this week, the Prime Minister of Tonga, rallying fellow South Pacific Island nations to negotiate debt forgiveness with China, expressed his fears that China could seize strategic assets.“If it happens in Sri Lanka, it can happen in the Pacific.”

Habantota is turning out to be a strategic blunder.

Did China actually set out to trap countries into debt or has the Belt and Road Initiative gone awry? It is conceivable that China is unfazed by the political blowback. Folklore has it that the Chinese take a very long term view of things. But it is more likely that China did not anticipate the blowback.

China seems to have underrated the vulnerability of its would-be client states to the vagaries of global capitalism and overrated the grip of the regimes that it is corrupting on power. China will not be the first great power to do this. The USA has been muscling and blundering its way, wreaking havoc around the world by conflating its interests and political values for the better part of a century.

Did China actually set out to trap countries into debt or has the Belt and Road Initiative gone awry? […]China seems to have underrated the vulnerability of its would-be client states to the vagaries of global capitalism, and overrated the grip on power of the regimes that it is corrupting. China will not be the first great power to do this.

The real Achilles heel of the debt traps is that China has little recourse should any of its distressed debtors default. Western lenders can and often take concerted action on defaulters (a la Greece and “the troika”), but China is a lone ranger.

In China, economic illiteracy on this scale is not without precedent. Sixty years ago, Chairman Mao had the brilliant idea that industrialization could be drilled down to producing copious amounts of grain and steel. The government set a target of doubling steel production within a year and overtaking Britain’s production in 15 years. China’s peasant farmers were herded into communes. Villagers were forced to set up backyard furnaces. Pots, pans and other metal possessions were seized and melted up to meet production quotas. Trees were decimated and even furniture burned to fuel the furnaces. The Great Leap Forward, history’s most monumental political blunder, cost between 20 and 40 million lives.

It is noteworthy that Kenya is the BRI’s only touchpoint on the African continent.

Kenya’s SGR, Uhuru Kenyatta’s erstwhile legacy project, has turned out to be the bugbear that this columnist among others warned that it would be. Its freight capacity is a third of what was promised, and it cannot be competitive without a hefty public subsidy. Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration has increased Kenya’s foreign debt two and a half fold, from US$9 billion to US$25 billion. The railway alone accounts for a third of this increase; another third is by sovereign bonds for which the country has nothing to show.

Public debt is budgeted at KSh 860 billion (U$ 8.6bn), 72 percent of the last financial year’s tax revenue. The question that is frequently asked now is whether, if Kenya cannot pay, the Chinese will take over the port of Mombasa. Word on the streets of Mombasa is that the port was pledged as security for the railway loans. In a manner of speaking, they already have. The Chinese have a concession to run the railway until 2027. That includes a take-or-pay freight assignment contract, which is to say, the Kenya Ports Authority, the port operator, has to meet the railway’s freight target or pay the railway for the unused capacity. In effect, the port is working for the railway.

The question that is frequently asked now is whether, if Kenya cannot pay, the Chinese will take over the port of Mombasa. Word on the streets of Mombasa is that the port was pledged as security for the railway loans. In a manner of speaking, they already have.

“It is not uncommon for a country to create a railway, ” said Charles Elliot, the Kenya Protectorate commissioner who oversaw the construction of the Uganda railway. “But it is uncommon for a railway to create a country.” Almost 120 years later, after it emerged that Kenyan workers are routinely subjected to physical punishment by Chinese, following which the Chinese ambassador dismissed this as Chinese culture, Kenyans are wondering whether the railway heralds a new age of Oriental colonialism. On this, my take is that China and Kenya’s political class have bitten off more than they can chew.

Seeing senior public officials grovelling and making excuses for these Chinese excesses gives perspective to history, from the chiefs who sold their people into slavery to those who signed away their lands to European imperialists for blankets and booze. We get it.

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